In an analysis published Thursday by Bloomberg View, Yale University professor of law Stephen L. Carter challenged the Obama administration’s stance that congress is acting out of bounds by considering a sanctions bill on Iran. The bill, which was authored by Senators Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Robert Menendez (D- N.J.), would implement new sanctions on Tehran in the event that nuclear negotiations fail to result in a deal by June 30^th. The White House contests that this legislation could upset current negotiations with Iran and undermine the administration’s diplomatic efforts.

Carter challenged the administration’s position by citing previous instances in which congressional pressure has shaped the executive office’s foreign policy, noting:

In the mid-1980s, dissatisfied with President Ronald Reagan’s policy of “constructive engagement” with the South Africa, members of Congress began pressing for tough economic sanctions. The Reagan administration objected that the proposed legislation would only disrupt negotiations and cause the apartheid regime to dig in its heels. After a protracted fight, Congress passed the sanctions over Reagan’s veto.
During the presidency of George H.W. Bush, the U.S. supported the claim of Cambodia’s government in exile to be the legitimate government of that country, even though

Vietnam had invaded and installed its own regime. As part of rapprochement with China, the U.S. and its allies insisted that the government in exile hold Cambodia’s seat at the United Nations. Congress was furious, because the coalition included representatives of the Khmer Rouge. After considerable pressure, including hearings and threats of legislation, the administration backed down.

Sometimes congressional pressure has taken a more formal path. President Abraham Lincoln chafed at interference from Congress’s Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, and indeed the committee did more harm than good. On the other hand, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, during its three decades in existence, was ahead of several presidents in urging improved safety devices for nuclear weapons, particularly those stored abroad, where they might potentially fall out of U.S. hands.

One can go back earlier, and find struggles between the legislative and executive branches in the early 19th century over how to deal with everything from attacks on U.S. ships by the Barbary states to Russian expansionism in North America.

Carter argued that “this sort of interplay among the branches is exactly what the Framers [of the Constitution] expected,” and further contended that the consideration of a sanctions bill is “nothing remotely unusual,” depicting the administration’s stance as being indicative of a “deeper constitutional issue.”

We can argue long and hard over the proper contours of the final deal with Tehran. But it’s wrong to suggest that Congress is misbehaving when it insists on protecting its prerogatives. Battles between the executive and legislative branches over foreign policy are as old as the republic. If the outcome of the current fight is a restriction on the freedom of this or a future president to go his own way, that’s a feature, not a bug.

On February 27, Bob Corker (R – Tenn.), Robert Menendez (D- N.J.), Lindsey Graham (R- S.C. ) and Tim Kaine (D-Va. ) introduced a bipartisan bill in the Senate, which would require Congressional review of any nuclear deal with Iran.

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